EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorEndres, Alfreden_US
dc.contributor.authorFriehe, Timen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the output, abatement, and investment decisions made by a monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law. The model applied considers both integrated and end-of-pipe abatement technologies. We find that in the case of fixed technology, in many instances negligence produces more favorable results than strict liability in terms of social welfare. The reason is that output under strict liability is always less than first-best output, whereas output under negligence is not similarly limited. However, this ranking of liability rules may be reversed when technology is endogenous. Under such conditions investment in both integrated and end-of-pipe abatement technologies under negligence is guided by motives foreign to the social planner, whereas the polluter's calculus under strict liability is similar to that of the social planner.en_US
dc.publisherCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) Munichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Resource and Environment Economics 3649en_US
dc.titleThe monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law: Incentives for abatement and R&Den_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
675946263.pdf214.42 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.