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dc.contributor.authorTorsvik, Gauteen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-14T12:18:27Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-14T12:18:27Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53134-
dc.description.abstractThis paper uses data from a firm with team production to investigate the association between workers' productivity, risk aversion and preferred bonus scheme (team or individual). Standard economics make a strong prediction in this case. Workers persistently producing above the team average should vote for an individual bonus. The only concern that may moderate this preference is risk aversion. The economic model predicts the case at hand fairly well. Relative work place productivity is strongly associated with a preference for individual bonuses, and risk aversion is associated with a preference for a team bonus. There is, however, one noticeable exception to this pattern: a substantial fraction of low performers prefer an individual bonus. I argue there are two types of other regarding concerns that can explain why under-performers prefer a payment system that reduces their income; distributional fairness and social emotions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Labour Markets 3658en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpayment systemsen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial appraisalen_US
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen_US
dc.titleTeam or individual: What determines workers' preferred bonus schemes?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn679524495en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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