Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53087
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dc.contributor.authorAzam, Jean-Paulen_US
dc.contributor.authorHoeffler, Ankeen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-14T09:51:08Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-14T09:51:08Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53087-
dc.description.abstractA simple two-stage game-theoretic model of conflict is analysed, where the government can send raiders for terrorising the population to flee before the fighting proper begins. The resulting displacement of population reduces the efficiency of the guerrilla in the fight against the government. Conditions are spelled out for a sub-game perfect equilibrium to exist where terror substitutes for fighting, when the government can afford it. The model’s predictions are tested using data on refugees in Africa, showing that, after controlling for war, ODA has a positive impact on the outflow of refugees, as predicted.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUNU-WIDER |cHelsinkien_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWIDER Discussion Papers // World Institute for Development Economics (UNU-WIDER) |x2001/46en_US
dc.subject.jelC21en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelO55en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcivil waren_US
dc.subject.keywordAfricaen_US
dc.subject.keywordgame theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordrefugeesen_US
dc.subject.stwBürgerkriegen_US
dc.subject.stwGewalten_US
dc.subject.stwFlüchtlingeen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwAfrikaen_US
dc.titleViolence against civilians in civil wars: Looting or terror?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn333454863en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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