Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53087 
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dc.contributor.authorAzam, Jean-Paulen
dc.contributor.authorHoeffler, Ankeen
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-14T09:51:08Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-14T09:51:08Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53087-
dc.description.abstractA simple two-stage game-theoretic model of conflict is analysed, where the government can send raiders for terrorising the population to flee before the fighting proper begins. The resulting displacement of population reduces the efficiency of the guerrilla in the fight against the government. Conditions are spelled out for a sub-game perfect equilibrium to exist where terror substitutes for fighting, when the government can afford it. The model’s predictions are tested using data on refugees in Africa, showing that, after controlling for war, ODA has a positive impact on the outflow of refugees, as predicted.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) |cHelsinkien
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWIDER Discussion Paper |x2001/46en
dc.subject.jelC21en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelO55en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcivil waren
dc.subject.keywordAfricaen
dc.subject.keywordgame theoryen
dc.subject.keywordrefugeesen
dc.subject.stwBürgerkriegen
dc.subject.stwGewalten
dc.subject.stwFlüchtlingeen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwAfrikaen
dc.titleViolence against civilians in civil wars: Looting or terror?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn333454863en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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