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dc.contributor.authorMehlum, Halvoren_US
dc.contributor.authorMoene, Karl Oveen_US
dc.contributor.authorTorvik, Ragnaren_US
dc.description.abstractWe consider extortion gangs that are mafia-like in their protection of targets, but that are unlike the Mafia in their competition over targets. Does this type of organized crime pay? How are the returns to extortion affected by the number of competing extortionists and the violence they apply? Does the supply of extortions create the demand for protection that the groups live from? In order to answer such questions we analyse a model that focus on the trade-off between congestion and demand creation in the market for extortions. – violence ; extortion ; economics of organized crimeen_US
dc.publisherUNU-WIDER Helsinkien_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWIDER Discussion Papers // World Institute for Development Economics (UNU-WIDER) 2001/26en_US
dc.subject.stwOrganisierte Kriminalitäten_US
dc.titleThe market for extortionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:WIDER Discussion Papers, United Nations University (UNU)

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