Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53079
Authors: 
Mehlum, Halvor
Moene, Karl Ove
Torvik, Ragnar
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
WIDER Discussion Papers // World Institute for Development Economics (UNU-WIDER) 2001/26
Abstract: 
We consider extortion gangs that are mafia-like in their protection of targets, but that are unlike the Mafia in their competition over targets. Does this type of organized crime pay? How are the returns to extortion affected by the number of competing extortionists and the violence they apply? Does the supply of extortions create the demand for protection that the groups live from? In order to answer such questions we analyse a model that focus on the trade-off between congestion and demand creation in the market for extortions. – violence ; extortion ; economics of organized crime
JEL: 
D74
K00
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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