Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/52855 
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2001/92
Publisher: 
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
Abstract: 
The paper examines two issues associated with aid and fiscal policy. First, how best the conditionality behind foreign aid, sometimes non-economic, is complied with in a principal-agent framework. In a multiple task and multiple principal framework, principals are better off cooperating and making the agent’s efforts more complementary. Secondly, I examine endogenous policy formation in the context of domestic politics. This involves interaction between policy makers and domestic special interest groups. Outside donors need to be aware of these processes, so that they can ultimately influence it. I examine 3 endogenous policy processes: median voter, lobbying, and a combination of political contributions as well as altruism.
Subjects: 
aid conditionality
fiscal policy
political processes
endogenous policy formation
JEL: 
H60
O11
O12
O19
ISBN: 
9291900052
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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