Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52798
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dc.contributor.authorAddison, Tonyen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-14T09:39:40Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-14T09:39:40Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9291901075en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/52798-
dc.description.abstractThe last twenty years has seen an extensive and exhausting debate on how to improve the institutions of African states. But progress has been patchy at best. Many of the problems arise from a ‘partial-reform equilibrium’; initial reforms are undertaken, but then strong resistance is encountered, and reform is not completed. Consequently, although donors may be heartened to find governments speaking the rhetoric of private-sector development, governments may not in fact buy into many second-generation reforms. Public management and public expenditure reform, security-sector reform, and revenue reform are all unfinished agendas. Donor assistance to countries that are stuck in a partial-reform equilibrium is most effective when internal political dynamics succeed in changing national leaderships, as in Ghana. – aid ; democracy ; sub-Saharan Africaen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUNU-WIDER |cHelsinkien_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWIDER Discussion Papers // World Institute for Development Economics (UNU-WIDER) |x2001/141en_US
dc.subject.jelO10en_US
dc.subject.jelO55en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungshilfeen_US
dc.subject.stwInstitutioneller Wandelen_US
dc.subject.stwZentralafrikaen_US
dc.titleDo donors matter for institutional reform in Africa?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn345630319en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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