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dc.contributor.authorAddison, Tonyen_US
dc.contributor.authorLeBillon, Philippeen_US
dc.contributor.authorMurshed, S. Mansooben_US
dc.description.abstractWar provides economic opportunities, such as the capture of valuable natural resources, that are unavailable in peacetime. However, belligerents may prefer low-intensity conflict to total war when the former has a greater pay-off. The paper therefore uses a two-actor model to capture the continuum from total war to complete peace that often characterises Africa's conflicts. This is in contrast to the existing literature with its focus on mutually exclusive states of total war or complete peace, an assumption which is more relevant to Europe's inter-state wars than to Africa's civil wars. The paper also discusses changes in the economic incentives of belligerents that may induce peaceful behaviour. – aid ; conflict ; natural resources ; sub-Saharan Africaen_US
dc.publisherUNU-WIDER Helsinkien_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWIDER Discussion Papers // World Institute for Development Economics (UNU-WIDER) 2001/51en_US
dc.subject.stwNatürliche Ressourcenen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitischer Konflikten_US
dc.titleConflict in Africa: The cost of peaceful behaviouren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:WIDER Discussion Papers, United Nations University (UNU)

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