Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/52760 
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dc.contributor.authorAddison, Tonyen
dc.contributor.authorLeBillon, Philippeen
dc.contributor.authorMurshed, S. Mansooben
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-14T09:38:45Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-14T09:38:45Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/52760-
dc.description.abstractWar provides economic opportunities, such as the capture of valuable natural resources, that are unavailable in peacetime. However, belligerents may prefer low-intensity conflict to total war when the former has a greater pay-off. The paper therefore uses a two-actor model to capture the continuum from total war to complete peace that often characterises Africa's conflicts. This is in contrast to the existing literature with its focus on mutually exclusive states of total war or complete peace, an assumption which is more relevant to Europe's inter-state wars than to Africa's civil wars. The paper also discusses changes in the economic incentives of belligerents that may induce peaceful behaviour. – aid ; conflict ; natural resources ; sub-Saharan Africaen
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) |cHelsinkien
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWIDER Discussion Paper |x2001/51en
dc.subject.jelO10en
dc.subject.jelO55en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwNatürliche Ressourcenen
dc.subject.stwZentralafrikaen
dc.subject.stwPolitischer Konflikten
dc.titleConflict in Africa: The cost of peaceful behaviour-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn333455657en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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