Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52730
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dc.contributor.authorBerninghaus, Siegfried K.en_US
dc.contributor.authorTodorova, Loraen_US
dc.contributor.authorVogt, Bodoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-13T16:27:05Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-13T16:27:05Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/52730-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents results from an experiment designed to study the effect of self reporting risk preferences on strategy choices made in a subsequently played 2x2 coordination game. The main finding is that the act of answering a questionnaire about one's own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior. Within a best response correspondence framework, this result can be explained by a change in either risk preferences or beliefs. We find that self reporting risk preferences induces an increase in subjects' risk aversion while keeping their beliefs unchanged. Our findings raise some questions about the stability of strategy choices in coordination games.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aKIT |cKarlsruheen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking paper series in economics |x37en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcoordination gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordquestionnaireen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordbeliefsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbest response correspondenceen_US
dc.titleA simple questionnaire can change everything: Are strategy choices in coordination games stable?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn677766823en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:kitwps:37-

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