|
EconStor >
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW), Kiel >
Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52660
|
| | |
| Title: | | Cooperation in a resource extraction game  |
| Authors: | | Stähler, Frank Wagner, Friedrich |
| Issue Date: | | 1998 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Kiel Working Papers 846 |
| Abstract: | | An exhaustible stock of resources may be exploited by N players. An arbitrarily long duration of the game is only possible, if the utility function satisfies certain restrictions at small values R of extraction. We find that stability against unilateral defection occurs if the elasticity of the marginal utility turns out to be larger than (N - 1 )/N, however independent of the value of the discount factor. Hence we find that cooperation does not depend on the discount factor for a certain range of elasticities. Analogy to phase transitions in statistical physics is discussed. |
| JEL: | | C72 C73 Q30 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des IfW Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52660
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|