EconStor >
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW), Kiel >
Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52660
  
Title:Cooperation in a resource extraction game PDF Logo
Authors:Stähler, Frank
Wagner, Friedrich
Issue Date:1998
Series/Report no.:Kiel Working Papers 846
Abstract:An exhaustible stock of resources may be exploited by N players. An arbitrarily long duration of the game is only possible, if the utility function satisfies certain restrictions at small values R of extraction. We find that stability against unilateral defection occurs if the elasticity of the marginal utility turns out to be larger than (N - 1 )/N, however independent of the value of the discount factor. Hence we find that cooperation does not depend on the discount factor for a certain range of elasticities. Analogy to phase transitions in statistical physics is discussed.
JEL:C72
C73
Q30
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des IfW

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
673099490.pdf749 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52660

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.