Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52660
Authors: 
Stähler, Frank
Wagner, Friedrich
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Papers 846
Abstract: 
An exhaustible stock of resources may be exploited by N players. An arbitrarily long duration of the game is only possible, if the utility function satisfies certain restrictions at small values R of extraction. We find that stability against unilateral defection occurs if the elasticity of the marginal utility turns out to be larger than (N - 1 )/N, however independent of the value of the discount factor. Hence we find that cooperation does not depend on the discount factor for a certain range of elasticities. Analogy to phase transitions in statistical physics is discussed.
JEL: 
C72
C73
Q30
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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