Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52494
Authors: 
Resende, Marcelo
Zeidan, Rodrigo M.
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation 3623
Abstract: 
The paper undertakes a cross-sectoral analysis of a salient empirical implication of the model of tacit collusion advanced by Abreu et al (1986). Specifically, the prevalence of a first order Markovian process for alternating between price wars and collusive periods is assessed by means of non-parametric tests. The analysis focuses on 30 different industries in Canada. The evidence provides weak support for optimal collusion in one industry, which is consistent with the idea that such collusive arrangements are unusual.
Subjects: 
tacit collusion
game theory
Canada
price war
JEL: 
L13
L22
L61
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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