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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52489
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| Title: | | Resource rents, democracy and corruption: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa  |
| Authors: | | Arezki, Rabah Gylfason, Thorvaldur |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Resource and Environment Economics 3575 |
| Abstract: | | We examine the effect of the interaction between resource rents and democracy on corruption for a panel of 29 Sub-Saharan countries during the period from 1985 to 2007. We find that higher resource rents lead to more corruption and that the effect is significantly stronger in less democratic countries. Surprisingly, we also find that higher resource rents lead to fewer internal conflicts and that less democratic countries face not a higher but a lower likelihood of conflicts following an increase in resource rents. We argue that these findings can be explained by the ability of the political elites in less democratic countries to more effectively quell the masses through redistribution of rents to the public. We support our argument by documenting that higher resource rents lead to more (less) government spending in less (more) democratic countries. Our findings suggest that the mechanisms through which resource rents affect corruption cannot be separated from political systems. |
| Subjects: | | resource rents corruption political systems internal conflicts |
| JEL: | | C33 D73 D74 D72 H21 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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