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dc.contributor.authorBlankart, Charles B.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-28en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-01T13:03:20Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-01T13:03:20Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/52432-
dc.description.abstractSwitzerland is often viewed as a federalist curiosity and a unique form of direct democracy. But this view does not provide a proper understanding of the country. A theory of Switzerland is necessary. A consideration of the initial, exogenous geographical situation of Swiss territory provides a better understanding of the country's development. It was out of the frac-tured geography that the institutions of federalism and direct democracy as they are known today developed and established themselves. Although there was a trend to internal centralisation in the 20th century, the regional authorities have maintained their autonomy considerably better in Switzerland than in other states. An important factor is that the federal government, cantons and municipalities are each responsible for their own finances and debts. This stabilises not only the budget of regional and local authorities but also prevents interference on the part of the central government.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Public Finance 3646en_US
dc.subject.jelH60en_US
dc.subject.jelH70en_US
dc.subject.jelN40en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal federalismen_US
dc.titleAn economic theory of Switzerlanden_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn67464705Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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