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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52426
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Brueckner, Jan K. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Picard, Pierre M. | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-10-06 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-12-01T13:03:10Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-12-01T13:03:10Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52426 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In this paper, we ask how antitrust immunity subject to a carve-out affects collusion incentives in international airline alliances. We show that the gains from economies of density due to higher interline traffic under the alliance strengthen the incentive to collude on the interhub segment, while the accompanying revenue gain heightens the incentive to defect from collusive behavior. These two effects exactly cancel in the case of linear demands and linear economies of density. Under this approximation, the incentives for interhub collusion are no different before and after the emergence of an airline alliance subject to a carve-out. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation 3593 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L00 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | collusion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | carve-out | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Airline alliances, carve-outs and collusion | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 66943941X | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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