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Title:Resisting moral wiggle room: How robust is reciprocity? PDF Logo
Authors:van der Weele, Joël
Kulisa, Julija
Kosfeld, Michael
Friebel, Guido
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5374
Abstract:Several studies have shown that dictator-game giving declines substantially if the dictator can exploit situational excuses for not being generous. In this experimental study we investigate if this result extends to more natural social interactions involving reciprocal behavior. We provide the second mover in a reciprocal game with an excuse for not reciprocating, an excuse which has previously been shown to strongly reduce giving in dictator games. We do not find that the availability of the excuse has any effect at all on reciprocal behavior, and conclude that reciprocity is a more stable disposition than dictator game generosity.
moral wiggle room
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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