Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52009
Authors: 
Cheung, Stephen L.
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5689
Abstract: 
This paper introduces new experimental designs to enrich understanding of conditional cooperation and punishment in public good games. The key to these methods is to elicit complete contribution or punishment profiles using the strategy method. It is found that the selfish bias in conditional cooperation is made significantly worse when other players contribute more unequally. Contingent punishment strategies are found to increase with decreasing contributions by the target player and also increasing contributions by a third player. Antisocial punishments are not directed specifically toward high contributors, but may be motivated by pre-emptive retaliation against punishment a player expects to incur.
Subjects: 
conditional cooperation
selfish bias
punishment
public good experiment
strategy method
JEL: 
C72
C91
D70
H41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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