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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51942
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Dobbelaere, Sabien | en |
dc.contributor.author | Luttens, Roland Iwan | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-07-19 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-11-23T11:40:01Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-11-23T11:40:01Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:101:1-201104113917 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51942 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract under binding risk-neutral efficient bargaining. We also demonstrate that our non-cooperative equilibrium wages and profits coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x5518 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C71 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J51 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L20 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | collective bargaining | en |
dc.subject.keyword | union | en |
dc.subject.keyword | firm | en |
dc.subject.keyword | bargaining power | en |
dc.subject.keyword | non-binding contract | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohnverhandlungen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhandlungsmacht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Collective bargaining under non-binding contracts | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 664414842 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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