Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51942 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDobbelaere, Sabienen
dc.contributor.authorLuttens, Roland Iwanen
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-19-
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:40:01Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:40:01Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201104113917en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51942-
dc.description.abstractWe introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract under binding risk-neutral efficient bargaining. We also demonstrate that our non-cooperative equilibrium wages and profits coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x5518en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.jelJ51en
dc.subject.jelL20en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcollective bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordunionen
dc.subject.keywordfirmen
dc.subject.keywordbargaining poweren
dc.subject.keywordnon-binding contracten
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungsmachten
dc.subject.stwKooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCollective bargaining under non-binding contracts-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn664414842en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.