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dc.contributor.authorDobbelaere, Sabienen_US
dc.contributor.authorLuttens, Roland Iwanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:40:01Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:40:01Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201104113917en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51942-
dc.description.abstractWe introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract under binding risk-neutral efficient bargaining. We also demonstrate that our non-cooperative equilibrium wages and profits coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5518en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.jelJ51en_US
dc.subject.jelL20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcollective bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordunionen_US
dc.subject.keywordfirmen_US
dc.subject.keywordbargaining poweren_US
dc.subject.keywordnon-binding contracten_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungsmachten_US
dc.subject.stwKooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCollective bargaining under non-binding contractsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn664414842en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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