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Title:Collective bargaining under non-binding contracts PDF Logo
Authors:Dobbelaere, Sabien
Luttens, Roland Iwan
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5518
Abstract:We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract under binding risk-neutral efficient bargaining. We also demonstrate that our non-cooperative equilibrium wages and profits coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.
Subjects:collective bargaining
union
firm
bargaining power
non-binding contract
JEL:C71
J51
L20
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:101:1-201104113917
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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