Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51900 
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dc.contributor.authorGerdes, Christeren
dc.contributor.authorGränsmark, Patriken
dc.contributor.authorRosholm, Michaelen
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-12-
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:39:01Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:39:01Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201107283903en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51900-
dc.description.abstractWe examine rational learning among expert chess players and how they update their beliefs in repeated games with the same opponent. We present a model that explains how equilibrium play is affected when players change their choice of strategy when receiving additional information from each encounter. We employ a large international panel dataset with controls for risk preferences and playing skills whereby the latter accounts for ability. Although expert chess players are intelligent, productive and equipped with adequate data and specialized computer programs, we find large learning effects. Moreover, as predicted by the model, risk-averse players learn substantially faster.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x5862en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordrational learningen
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen
dc.subject.keywordbeliefsen
dc.titleChicken or checkin'? Rational learning in repeated chess games-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn669714658en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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