Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51900
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dc.contributor.authorGerdes, Christeren_US
dc.contributor.authorGränsmark, Patriken_US
dc.contributor.authorRosholm, Michaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:39:01Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:39:01Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201107283903en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51900-
dc.description.abstractWe examine rational learning among expert chess players and how they update their beliefs in repeated games with the same opponent. We present a model that explains how equilibrium play is affected when players change their choice of strategy when receiving additional information from each encounter. We employ a large international panel dataset with controls for risk preferences and playing skills whereby the latter accounts for ability. Although expert chess players are intelligent, productive and equipped with adequate data and specialized computer programs, we find large learning effects. Moreover, as predicted by the model, risk-averse players learn substantially faster.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit |x5862en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordrational learningen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen_US
dc.subject.keywordbeliefsen_US
dc.titleChicken or checkin'? Rational learning in repeated chess gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn669714658en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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