Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51794
Authors: 
Gautier, Pieter A.
Holzner, Christian L.
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5859
Abstract: 
When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise because workers typically do not know where other workers apply to and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider. The first coordination friction affects network formation, while the second coordination friction affects network clearing. We show that those frictions and the wage mechanism are in general not independent. The wage mechanism determines both the distribution of networks that can arise and the number of matches on a given network. Equilibria that exhibit wage dispersion are inefficient in terms of network formation. Under complete recall (firms can go back and forth between all their candidates) only wage mechanisms that allow for ex post Bertrand competition generate the maximum matching on a realized network.
Subjects: 
efficiency
network clearing
random bipartite network formation
simultaneous search
JEL: 
D83
D85
E24
J64
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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