EconStor >
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Bonn >
IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51773
  
Title:Managerial incentives and favoritism in promotion decisions: Theory and field evidence PDF Logo
Authors:Berger, Johannes
Herbertz, Claus
Sliwka, Dirk
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5543
Abstract:This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for managers who decide upon promotion. Second, we analyze matched employer-employee survey data with detailed firm level information on managerial incentive schemes and find that perceived promotion quality is indeed substantially higher when managers receive performance-related pay or participate in gain sharing plans.
Subjects:incentives
favoritism
nepotism
tournaments
JEL:J33
M51
M52
M54
J71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:101:1-201104133606
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
664679013.pdf219.61 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51773

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.