Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51756
Authors: 
Almeida, Rita K.
Carneiro, Pedro
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5902
Abstract: 
Enforcement of labor regulations in the formal sector may drive workers to informality because they increase the costs of formal labor. But better compliance with mandated benefits makes it attractive to be a formal employee. We show that, in locations with frequent inspections workers pay for mandated benefits by receiving lower wages. Wage rigidity prevents downward adjustment at the bottom of the wage distribution. As a result, lower paid formal sector jobs become attractive to some informal workers, inducing them to want to move to the formal sector.
Subjects: 
informality
labor regulation
JEL: 
J2
J3
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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