Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51700
Authors: 
Doepke, Matthias
Tertilt, Michèle
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5637
Abstract: 
Empirical evidence suggests that money in the hands of mothers (as opposed to their husbands) benefits children. Does this observation imply that targeting transfers to women is good economic policy? We develop a series of noncooperative family bargaining models to understand what kind of frictions can give rise to the observed empirical relationships. We then assess the policy implications of these models. We find that targeting transfers to women can have unintended consequences and may fail to make children better off. Moreover, different forms of empowering women may lead to opposite results. More research is needed to distinguish between alternative theoretical models.
Subjects: 
female empowerment
gender equality
development
theory of the household
marital bargaining
JEL: 
D13
J16
O10
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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