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dc.contributor.authorGroßer, Jensen_US
dc.contributor.authorReuben, Ernestoen_US
dc.contributor.authorTymula, Agnieszkaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:32:39Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:32:39Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51673-
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally study the common wisdom that money buys political influence. In the game, one lobbyist has the opportunity to influence redistributive tax policies in her favor by transferring money to two competing candidates. The success of the lobbying investment depends on whether or not the candidates are willing to respond and able to collude on lowtax policies that do not harm their relative chances in the elections. In the experiment, we find that lobbying is never successful when the lobbyist and candidates interact just once. By contrast, it yields substantially lower redistribution in about 40% of societies with finitelyrepeated encounters. However, lobbying investments are not always profitable, and profitsharing between the lobbyist and candidates depends on prominent equity norms. Our experimental results shed new light on the complex process of buying political influence in everyday politics and help explain why only relatively few corporate firms do actually lobby.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIZA Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5332en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelH10en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordlobbyingen_US
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen_US
dc.subject.keywordelectionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen_US
dc.titleTacit lobbying agreements: An experimental studyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn668943173en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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