Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51571 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 5755
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the performance of promotion tournaments with heterogeneous participants in two dimensions: incentive provision and selection. Our theoretical analysis reveals a trade-off for the tournament designer between the two goals: While total effort is maximized if less heterogeneous participants compete against each other early in the tournament, letting more heterogeneous participants compete early increases the accuracy in selection. Experimental evidence supports our theoretical findings, indicating that the optimal design of promotion tournaments crucially depends on the objectives of the tournament designer. These findings have important implications for the optimal design of promotion tournaments in organizations.
Schlagwörter: 
promotion tournaments
heterogeneity
incentive provision
selection
JEL: 
M52
J33
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
302.69 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.