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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51563
  

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dc.contributor.authorBarth, Anne-Kathrinen_US
dc.contributor.authorGraf, Juliaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-21T17:05:38Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-21T17:05:38Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-035-2en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51563-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates why consumers choose calling plans that are not always cost-minimizing. Our approach is twofold: we account for general difficulties facing a tariff choice, as well as for biased preferences. We provide evidence from an experiment among German university students and staff, finding that participants are often not aware of their actual consumption. In line with the findings on at-rate biases, respondents systematically overestimate their consumption. On the other hand, they are generally able and willing to detect optimal tariffs. Furthermore, with increasing usage level, consumers' performance improves. However, some participants hold strong preferences for certain tariff forms, seducing them to choose cost-dominated offers. In our setup, we find that respondents prefer tariffs involving subsidies or hire-purchase options for handsets over contracts with buy now options.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDICE Düsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDICE discussion paper 36en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBehavioral Economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordMobile phone tariffsen_US
dc.subject.keywordHandset subsidyen_US
dc.subject.keywordHire-purchase of deviceen_US
dc.titleIrrationality rings! - Experimental evidence on mobile tariff choicesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn672345536en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:36-
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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