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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51561
  

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dc.contributor.authorJeitschko, Thomas D.en_US
dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-21T17:05:32Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-21T17:05:32Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-034-5en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51561-
dc.description.abstractWe contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with one where the signal-generating mechanism is stochastic. With stochastic signals a unique equilibrium emerges that involves separation and has intuitive comparative-static properties as the degree of signaling depends on the prior type distribution. With deterministic signals both pooling and separating configurations occur. Laboratory data support the theory: In the stochastic variant, there is more signaling behavior than with deterministic signals, and less frequent types distort their signals relatively more. Moreover, the degree of congruence between equilibrium and subject behavior is greater in stochastic settings compared to deterministic treatments.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDICE Düsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDICE discussion paper 35en_US
dc.subject.jelC7en_US
dc.subject.jelC9en_US
dc.subject.jelD8en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordlearningen_US
dc.subject.keywordnoiseen_US
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen_US
dc.subject.keywordstochastic environmentsen_US
dc.titleSignaling in deterministic and stochastic settingsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn671587641en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:35-
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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