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dc.contributor.authorMertins, Vanessaen_US
dc.contributor.authorEgbert, Henriken_US
dc.contributor.authorKönen, Tanjaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-18T11:20:51Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-18T11:20:51Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51406-
dc.description.abstractWe use a power-to-resist game to find out the effects of individuals' judgments about a proposer's selection procedure on the willingness to offer resistance against proposed outcomes. In the experiment, one individual is selected on the grounds of a particular procedure. This individual is allowed to propose how to allocate a pie among five group members: herself and four responders. After that each responder in the group can decide whether to offer costly resistance against the proposed allocation. Resistance is modeled as a threshold public good. If resistance is successful, the proposer receives nothing. If resistance is unsuccessful, the pie is distributed according to the proposer's decision. We find that resistance increases with (a) the size of the proposal, with (b) subjectively perceived unfairness of the selection procedure of the proposer's role, and with (c) the individual procedural preferences being unsatisfied. Surprisingly, resistance is not affected by the fact whether or not the group's majority vote on the selection procedure is respected. We check for robustness of our results and find that results are stable over two countries. The presented evidence suggests that procedural effects over and above outcomes are relevant in strategic interaction.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIAAEG Trieren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIAAEG discussion paper series 03/2011en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelO57en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordselection procedureen_US
dc.subject.keywordfavored process effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordfair process effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordprocedural fairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordlegitimacyen_US
dc.titleThe effects of individual judgments about selection procedures: Results from a power-to-resist gameen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn671901230en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Institut für Arbeitsrecht und Arbeitsbeziehungen in der Europäischen Union, Trier

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