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dc.contributor.authorMertins, Vanessaen_US
dc.description.abstractBy reporting data from a laboratory experiment, we provide clear evidence that people value procedures apart from their effects on consequences. We implement a game with one proposer who has distributive power over a pie and four responders who can invest in resistance against the proposer's demand. The proposer is appointed by the use of one of two feasible appointment procedures. We elicit participants' preferences and fairness evaluations over both procedures and study whether responders' resistance against various demands are affected by their procedural judgments. Although the fair process effect, describing the finding that people are more likely to accept outcomes when they feel that they are made via fair procedures, is said to be exceedingly robust, we do not find support for any significant behavioral differences according to people's fairness evaluations. In contrast, we show that procedural satisfaction matters. Surprisingly, responders whose procedural preferences are satisfied offer significantly more resistance than those whose procedural preferences are violated.en_US
dc.publisherIAAEG Trieren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIAAEG discussion paper series 07/2008en_US
dc.subject.keywordfair process effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordfrustration effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordprocedural fairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordprocedural preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordthreshold public gooden_US
dc.titleProcedural satisfaction matters: Procedural fairness does not ; an experiment studying the effects of procedural judgments on outcome acceptanceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Institut für Arbeitsrecht und Arbeitsbeziehungen in der Europäischen Union, Trier

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