Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51404
Authors: 
Mertins, Vanessa
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
IAAEG discussion paper series 07/2008
Abstract: 
By reporting data from a laboratory experiment, we provide clear evidence that people value procedures apart from their effects on consequences. We implement a game with one proposer who has distributive power over a pie and four responders who can invest in resistance against the proposer's demand. The proposer is appointed by the use of one of two feasible appointment procedures. We elicit participants' preferences and fairness evaluations over both procedures and study whether responders' resistance against various demands are affected by their procedural judgments. Although the fair process effect, describing the finding that people are more likely to accept outcomes when they feel that they are made via fair procedures, is said to be exceedingly robust, we do not find support for any significant behavioral differences according to people's fairness evaluations. In contrast, we show that procedural satisfaction matters. Surprisingly, responders whose procedural preferences are satisfied offer significantly more resistance than those whose procedural preferences are violated.
Subjects: 
experiment
fair process effect
frustration effect
procedural fairness
procedural preferences
resistance
threshold public good
JEL: 
C72
C91
J52
D23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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