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dc.contributor.authorSchneider, Martinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-18T11:20:20Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-18T11:20:20Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51385-
dc.description.abstractControlling the performance of employed physicians, university professors, or tenured judges is a difficult managerial problem, because these professionals perform complex tasks that are hard to measure and because many of the economic incentives common to private-sector employees do not apply in the public sector. As yet, our knowledge of performance management for professionals is only limited. Therefore, this paper analyses incentives for professional judges in one German and one U.S. organisation. The comparative case study exploits qualitative information drawn from interviews along with quantitative performance and personnel data. Management in both organisations seeks to secure good performance in ways compatible with the concept of the professional bureaucracy: Administrative tasks are delegated to peers, internal recruitment prevails, and a quantitative benchmarking is maintained in order to appeal to judges' professional ethics. In the German career judiciary, promotion prospects can be expected to influence performance. This is confirmed empirically by estimating behavioural production functions.en_US
dc.language.isogeren_US
dc.publisherIAAEG Trieren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIAAEG discussion paper series 2002/03en_US
dc.subject.jelJ45en_US
dc.subject.jelK31en_US
dc.subject.jelM12en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcourtsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinternal labour marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordprofessionalsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbehavioural production functionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcareer concernsen_US
dc.titleLeistungssteuerung und Karriereanreize für professionals: Ein Vergleich deutscher und amerikanischer Berufsrichteren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn67219449Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Institut für Arbeitsrecht und Arbeitsbeziehungen in der Europäischen Union, Trier

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