Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51381 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CAWM Discussion Paper No. 37
Publisher: 
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (CAWM), Münster
Abstract: 
In this paper I examine the influence which a population of different behavioral types may have on the provision of public goods. In particular, the population or subject pool consists of three behavioral types: myopic selfish agents, enlightened selfish agents and ethically motivated agents. I use a simple agent-based simulation approach that incorporates type interaction based on forward-looking conditional cooperation within a standard linear public goods model. Among other things, I show that under the given circumstances non-provision of public goods is a negligible issue, even if the share of ethically motivated types in the population is rather small.
Subjects: 
Linear Public Goods Games
Conditional Cooperation
Ethical Behavior
Agentbased Modeling
Pareto-optimality
JEL: 
C15
C90
H41
A13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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