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dc.contributor.authorPickhardt, Michaelen_US
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I examine the relationship between Pareto-optimality and group size in linear public goods games or experiments. In particular, I use the standard setting of homogeneous linear public goods experiments and apply a recently developed tool to identify all Pareto-optimal allocations in such settings. It turns out that under any conceivable circumstances, ceteris paribus, small groups have a higher Pareto-ratio (Pareto-optimal allocations over total allocations) than large groups. Hence, if Pareto-optimality of an allocation is a property that makes such allocations acceptable and maintainable, small groups will find is easier to provide Pareto-optimal amounts of a public good than large groups. This is a novel reasoning for Mancur Olson's claim, in particular, with respect to what he has termed inclusive goods and inclusive groups.en_US
dc.publisherCAWM Münsteren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCAWM discussion paper / Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung Münster 48en_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordlinear public goods experimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinclusive groupsen_US
dc.titlePareto meets Olson: A note on Pareto-optimality and group size in linear public goods gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CAWM Discussion Papers, Universität Münster

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