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Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster (WWU) >
Centrum für angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung Münster (CAWM), Universität Münster >
CAWM Discussion Papers, Universität Münster >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51364
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Apolte, Thomas | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-11-17 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-11-17T16:40:20Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-11-17T16:40:20Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51364 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In this paper the political economy of revolutions is revisited, as it has been developed and applied in a number of publications by Acemoglu and Robinson. We criticize the fact that these authors abstract from collective-action problems and focus on inequality of income or wealth instead. In doing so, they reanimate a long but misleading tradition in social sciences, namely to directly deduct prospective group behavior from the collective interest of a group. We show that, because of collective-action problems, income inequality is not a sufficient condition for a revolution to occur. Furthermore, we also show that inequality does not even need to be a necessary condition, since all what is needed in order for a group to be interested in a revolution is that this group as a whole can expect to be a beneficiary of a revolution. For the latter to apply, however, inequality is not necessary. Hence, not inequality but rather a certain structure of commitment devices or their absence is crucial for explaining why revolutions sometimes occur and sometimes not. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CAWM Münster | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CAWM discussion paper / Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung Münster 29 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D74 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | O15 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | P16 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Credible Commitments | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Dictatorship | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Political Economy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Redistribution | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Why is there no revolution in North-Korea? The political economy of revolution revisited | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 672444933 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:29 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CAWM Discussion Papers, Universität Münster
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