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dc.contributor.authorFlinkerbusch, Kaien_US
dc.description.abstractFrom auction theory we know that multi-unit, pay-as-bid auctions in general lead to bid shading and thus to an inefficient allocation. This result is supported by historical data from the German market for balancing power, which show that bidders bid well above their actual costs. In contrast to the pay-as-bid auction, the Vickrey auction has the dominant strategy property and bidders reveal their true opportunity cost. Consequently, the Vickrey auction allocates efficiently. In this article we show how this auction format can facilitate an efficient capacity procurement process in the German reserve market.en_US
dc.publisherCAWM Münsteren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCAWM discussion paper / Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung Münster 52en_US
dc.subject.keywordElectricity marketen_US
dc.subject.keywordbalancing poweren_US
dc.subject.keyworduniform-price auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordpay-as-bid auctionen_US
dc.titleA more efficient procurement mechanism for reserver capacity in the German market for balancing poweren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CAWM Discussion Papers, Universität Münster

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