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| Title: | | Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game  |
| Authors: | | Dannenberg, Astrid Löschel, Andreas Paolacci, Gabriele Reif, Christiane Tavoni, Alessandro |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | ZEW Discussion Papers 11-065 |
| Abstract: | | We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty was particularly severe when it took the form of ambiguity, i.e. when players were not only unaware of the value of the threshold but also of its probability distribution. Early signaling of willingness to contribute and share the burden equitably helped groups in coping with threshold uncertainty. |
| Subjects: | | Public good threshold uncertainty ambiguity experiment |
| JEL: | | C72 C92 H41 Q54 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW ZEW Discussion Papers
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