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dc.contributor.authorKratzsch, Uween_US
dc.contributor.authorSieg, Gernoten_US
dc.contributor.authorStegemann, Ulrikeen_US
dc.description.abstractIf an emission reduction agreement with participation of all players is not enforceable because politicians are too myopic or not able to commit themselves to sustainable policies or costs of reducing emissions are too high, strategic investments in research and development (R&D) of green technology, for example sustainable drive-trains, can pave the way for a future treaty. Although no player will rationally reduce emissions on its own, investments in R&D by at least one player can change the strategic situation of negotiations to control emissions: Emission abatement costs will decrease so that a treaty with full participation can be achieved in future periods through time consistent sustainable policies.en_US
dc.publisherTechn. Univ., Inst. für Volkswirtschaftslehre Braunschweigen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics Department Working Paper Series 10en_US
dc.subject.keyworddiscount factoren_US
dc.subject.keywordendogenous technical changeen_US
dc.subject.keywordrepeated prisoner's dilemmaen_US
dc.titleA full participation agreement on global emission reduction through strategic investments in R&Den_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Economics Department Working Paper Series, TU Braunschweig

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