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EconStor >
Technische Universität Braunschweig >
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Braunschweig >
Economics Department Working Paper Series, TU Braunschweig >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51314
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kratzsch, Uwe | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Sieg, Gernot | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Stegemann, Ulrike | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-07-05 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-11-14T17:10:55Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-11-14T17:10:55Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51314 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly renegotiation- proof and subgame perfect equilibria in a game of international emission reduction exist if countries put a sufficiently high weight on future payoffs, even though there is a discontinuity in the required discount factor due to the integrity of the number of punishing countries. Treaties are easier to reach if the gas depreciates slowly. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Techn. Univ., Inst. für Volkswirtschaftslehre Braunschweig | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Economics Department Working Paper Series 11 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q54 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F53 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | global warming | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | international agreement | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | weak renegotiation-proofness | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Klimaschutz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Umweltabkommen | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verhandlungstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Treibhausgas | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Luftverunreinigung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 663609720 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:tbswps:11 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Economics Department Working Paper Series, TU Braunschweig
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