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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51314
  
Title:An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases PDF Logo
Authors:Kratzsch, Uwe
Sieg, Gernot
Stegemann, Ulrike
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Economics Department Working Paper Series 11
Abstract:This paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly renegotiation- proof and subgame perfect equilibria in a game of international emission reduction exist if countries put a sufficiently high weight on future payoffs, even though there is a discontinuity in the required discount factor due to the integrity of the number of punishing countries. Treaties are easier to reach if the gas depreciates slowly.
Subjects:global warming
international agreement
weak renegotiation-proofness
JEL:Q54
F53
H41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Economics Department Working Paper Series, TU Braunschweig

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