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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51313
  
Title:Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots PDF Logo
Authors:Sieg, Gernot
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Economics Department Working Paper Series 4
Abstract:Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport prots increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The prot-maximizing rule is a use-it- g < 1-or-lose-it rule.
Subjects:Airports
Grandfather rights
use-it-or-lose-it rule
airport slots
JEL:L93
R48
D42
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:gbv:084-24464
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Economics Department Working Paper Series, TU Braunschweig

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