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Technische Universität Braunschweig >
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Braunschweig >
Economics Department Working Paper Series, TU Braunschweig >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51313
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| Title: | | Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots  |
| Authors: | | Sieg, Gernot |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Economics Department Working Paper Series 4 |
| Abstract: | | Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport prots increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The prot-maximizing rule is a use-it- g < 1-or-lose-it rule. |
| Subjects: | | Airports Grandfather rights use-it-or-lose-it rule airport slots |
| JEL: | | L93 R48 D42 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:gbv:084-24464 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Economics Department Working Paper Series, TU Braunschweig
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