Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51310
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dc.contributor.authorGürtler, Marcen_US
dc.contributor.authorSieg, Gernoten_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-14T17:10:48Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-14T17:10:48Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:gbv:084-21506en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51310-
dc.description.abstractIf the government announces the termination of a subsidy paid for an irreversible investment under uncertainty, investors might decide to realize their investment so as to obtain the subsidy. These investors might have postponed an investment if future payment were assured. Depending on the degree of uncertainty and the time preference, the termination of the subsidy might cost the government more in toto than granting the subsidy on a continuing basis. A better strategy would be to reduce the subsidy in parts rather than to terminate the subsidy in its entirety.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInst. für Volkswirtschaftslehre |cBraunschweigen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Department Working Paper Series |x1en_US
dc.subject.jelH3en_US
dc.subject.jelD11en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordIrreversibilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordInvestmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordAnnouncement effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordSubsidyen_US
dc.subject.keywordTaxen_US
dc.titleCrunch time: A policy to avoid the announcement effect when terminating a subsidyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn58386659Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tbswps:1-

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