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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
KOF Working Papers No. 151
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using panel data for 191 countries over the period 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional and country effects, and duration dependence. There is also evidence that UNSC membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. The size of the loan, however, is not affected by UNSC membership.
Schlagwörter: 
IMF
UN Security Council
Voting
Aid
JEL: 
F33
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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