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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Manchester Business School Working Paper No. 545
Verlag: 
The University of Manchester, Manchester Business School, Manchester
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider an industry where one firm with a superior technology competes for market shares with several rivals. The owner of the superior technology (the dominant firm) can license or transfer the source of its dominance to a subset of rivals. Allowing the non-license takers to remain active in the market is a drain on the profit of the insiders, and we demonstrate that the dominant firm will only make a transfer of the superior technology if it can be used to foreclose some rival firms. Foreclosure of a subset of firms may thus be the outcome even without restrictions on the licensing schemes. Moreover, we show that when licensing is profitable, the dominant firm will prefer a complete transfer even if a partial transfer can be made.
Schlagwörter: 
licensing
foreclosure
contest
JEL: 
D21
L24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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