Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50632
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dc.contributor.authorCartwright, Edwarden_US
dc.contributor.authorPatel, Amrishen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-21T16:53:31Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-21T16:53:31Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50632-
dc.description.abstractAn individual's contribution to a public good may be seen by others as a signal of attributes such as generosity or wealth. An individual may, therefore, choose their contribution so as to send an appropriate signal to others. In this paper we question how the inferences made by others will influence the amount contributed to the public good. Evidence suggests that individuals are naive and biased towards taking things at face value. We contrast, therefore, contributions made to a public good if others are expected to make rational inferences versus contributions if others are expected to make naive inferences.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. of Kent, School of Economics |cCanterburyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSchool of Economics discussion papers |x08,07en_US
dc.subject.jelD8en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordsignallingen_US
dc.subject.keywordnaive beliefsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Werteen_US
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePublic goods, social norms and naive beliefsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn576822191en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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