Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/50632 
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dc.contributor.authorCartwright, Edwarden
dc.contributor.authorPatel, Amrishen
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-21T16:53:31Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-21T16:53:31Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50632-
dc.description.abstractAn individual's contribution to a public good may be seen by others as a signal of attributes such as generosity or wealth. An individual may, therefore, choose their contribution so as to send an appropriate signal to others. In this paper we question how the inferences made by others will influence the amount contributed to the public good. Evidence suggests that individuals are naive and biased towards taking things at face value. We contrast, therefore, contributions made to a public good if others are expected to make rational inferences versus contributions if others are expected to make naive inferences.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Kent, Department of Economics |cCanterburyen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDepartment of Economics Discussion Paper |x08,07en
dc.subject.jelD8en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordsignallingen
dc.subject.keywordnaive beliefsen
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Werteen
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePublic goods, social norms and naive beliefs-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn576822191en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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