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dc.contributor.authorBarde, Sylvainen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-21T16:53:22Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-21T16:53:22Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50621-
dc.description.abstractAn information-theoretic thought experiment is developed to provide a methodology for predicting endowment distributions in the absence of information on agent preferences. The allocation problem is first presented as a stylised knapsack problem. Although this knapsack allocation is intractable, the social planner can nevertheless make precise predictions concerning the endowment distribution by using its information-theoretic structure. By construction these predictions do not rest on the rationality of agents. It is also shown, however, that the knapsack problem is equivalent to a congestion game under weak assumptions, which means that the planner can nevertheless evaluate the optimality of the unobserved allocation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. of Kent, School of Economics Canterburyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSchool of Economics discussion papers 11,03en_US
dc.subject.jelC02en_US
dc.subject.jelC62en_US
dc.subject.jelD51en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordInformation theoretic measureen_US
dc.subject.keywordknapsack problemen_US
dc.subject.keywordcongestion gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordpotential functionen_US
dc.titleIgnorance is bliss: Rationality, information and equilibriumen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn654777837en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:School of Economics Discussion Papers, University of Kent

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