Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/50596 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorAlberti, Federicaen
dc.contributor.authorCartwright, Edwarden
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-14-
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-21T16:53:01Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-21T16:53:01Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50596-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate experimentally whether the endowment of potential contributors changes the success rate of providing threshold public goods. We find a U shaped relationship in which the success rate is relatively high when the endowment is either relatively small or large. We also find an inverted U shaped relationship in terms of the variance of contributions. This suggests that people find it hardest to coordinate and provide threshold public goods when endowments are of intermediate size. By this we mean that the endowment is small enough that people do need to contribute relatively a lot to fund the good, but is also large enough that no one person is critical in providing the good. Coordinating is difficult in this case because there is an incentive to free ride and the possibility to do so creating a conflict of interest.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Kent, School of Economics |cCanterburyen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSchool of Economics Discussion Papers |x10,09en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpublic gooden
dc.subject.keywordthresholden
dc.subject.keywordendowmenten
dc.titleDoes the endowment of contributors make a difference in threshold public games?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn64166138Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
510.56 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.