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dc.contributor.authorAlberti, Federicaen_US
dc.contributor.authorCartwright, Edwarden_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-21T16:53:01Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-21T16:53:01Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50596-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate experimentally whether the endowment of potential contributors changes the success rate of providing threshold public goods. We find a U shaped relationship in which the success rate is relatively high when the endowment is either relatively small or large. We also find an inverted U shaped relationship in terms of the variance of contributions. This suggests that people find it hardest to coordinate and provide threshold public goods when endowments are of intermediate size. By this we mean that the endowment is small enough that people do need to contribute relatively a lot to fund the good, but is also large enough that no one person is critical in providing the good. Coordinating is difficult in this case because there is an incentive to free ride and the possibility to do so creating a conflict of interest.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. of Kent, School of Economics Canterburyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSchool of Economics discussion papers 10,09en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic gooden_US
dc.subject.keywordthresholden_US
dc.subject.keywordendowmenten_US
dc.titleDoes the endowment of contributors make a difference in threshold public games?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn64166138Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:School of Economics Discussion Papers, University of Kent

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