Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50592
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dc.contributor.authorPatel, Amrishen_US
dc.contributor.authorCartwright, Edwarden_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-21T16:52:58Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-21T16:52:58Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50592-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyse the effect that naïve agents (those who take behavior at 'face value') have on the nature of social norms. After reviewing the use of signalling models to model conformity, we argue in favour of modelling naïve inferences in tandem with standard Bayes rational inferences. Naïve agents weaken the existence of social norms and reduce the range of actions that can become social norms.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. of Kent, School of Economics |cCanterburyen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSchool of Economics discussion papers |x09,06en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.jelZ13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordsignallingen_US
dc.subject.keywordconformityen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial normsen_US
dc.subject.keywordnaïve beliefsen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Werteen_US
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.titleSocial norms and naïve beliefsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn594004462en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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