Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/50592 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 09,06
Publisher: 
University of Kent, Department of Economics, Canterbury
Abstract: 
In this paper we analyse the effect that naïve agents (those who take behavior at 'face value') have on the nature of social norms. After reviewing the use of signalling models to model conformity, we argue in favour of modelling naïve inferences in tandem with standard Bayes rational inferences. Naïve agents weaken the existence of social norms and reduce the range of actions that can become social norms.
Subjects: 
signalling
conformity
social norms
naïve beliefs
JEL: 
D82
D83
Z13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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