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Title:Social norms and naïve beliefs PDF Logo
Authors:Patel, Amrish
Cartwright, Edward
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:School of Economics discussion papers 09,06
Abstract:In this paper we analyse the effect that naïve agents (those who take behavior at 'face value') have on the nature of social norms. After reviewing the use of signalling models to model conformity, we argue in favour of modelling naïve inferences in tandem with standard Bayes rational inferences. Naïve agents weaken the existence of social norms and reduce the range of actions that can become social norms.
Subjects:signalling
conformity
social norms
naïve beliefs
JEL:D82
D83
Z13
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:School of Economics Discussion Papers, University of Kent

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